Результаты (
английский) 2:
[копия]Скопировано!
These two situations are not akin to ‘politics as usual’. Instead, they capture the unpredicted outcomes of post-crisis struggles to reorganize structures of economic and political power within settings framed by several important factors. First, the 1997 crisis undermined the legitimacy, authority and capabilities of those in power, albeit to different degrees. Second, the agendas of crisis management and proposed solutions were socially and politically divisive, mostly because of cold and desperate calculations of potential losses and benefits. Third, some socio-economic repercussions stemmed directly from the crisis while others were fused with pre-crisis conflicts in political economy. And, fourth, there were diverse ideological representations of the situations, ranging from the blandly academic to the vociferously patriotic.<br><br>The causes, effects and unfolding of the 1997 crisis in both countries are too well rehearsed to bear repeating here. Suffice it to note that the very swift progression from initial currency depreciation to financial meltdown and then economic collapse was politically intimidating. Those who tried to preserve the pre-crisis order, or to overturn it, had to form contingent and unorthodox alliances that brought together desperate coalitions of interests, apparently incompatible political parties and loosely structured social movements. That partially explains the ‘untidy’ post-crisis politics that has not completed its respective courses in Malaysia and Thailand. Although the politics may be variously interpreted, <br><br>this paper tracks it to the interplay between state, neoliberalism, and social movements – against the 1997 crisis, naturally, but also against deep socio-political contradictions in the respective societies. To that end, the paper addresses the following questions: <br>1. How was the state positioned vis-à-vis neoliberalism before the 1997 crisis?<br>2. Within capitalist transformation, what were the antecedents of actually existing<br>neoliberalism?<br>3. What were the predispositions of social movements towards neoliberalism before<br>the 1997 crisis?<br>4. During the crisis, how did ‘political ambiguities’ influence the role of the social<br>movements?
переводится, пожалуйста, подождите..
