После того, как был разрушен второй

После того, как был разрушен второй гидроагрегат, а первый гидроагрегат был серьезно поврежден упавшей на него крышкой электрогенератора, из-за сброса нагрузки с электрогенераторов стали разгоняться и другие работавшие на тот момент гидроагрегаты. Раскрутка семи еще работавших на тот момент гидроагрегатов происходила при отключающейся системе управления. Волна воды, хлещущей из турбинного колодца второго гидроагрегата, последовательно разрушала системы управления агрегатами, сбивала емкости с маслом, из-за чего прекращалась смазка подшипников еще вращающихся роторов. Так как гидроагрегаты были соединены с трансформаторами попарно, то автоматика каждого второго из пары, видимо, еще успевала их аварийно притормозить после отключения трансформатора из-за разрушения первого из пары гидроагрегата. Именно поэтому агрегаты с четными номерами больше двух получили наименьшие повреждения (см. рис. 2). Пятый гидроагрегат в пару на тот момент не входил из-за отключения шестого за полгода до этого. Так что система аварийной защиты ООО «НПФ «Ракурс» при развитии катастрофы, видимо, все же спасала то, что еще было возможно спасти, но аварийные затворы на верхнем бьефе ею закрыты не были, потому что управление ими не предусматривалось при разработке системы

Результаты (английский) 1:

After it was destroyed by a second hydraulic system, and the first hydraulic system was severely damaged by a falling electric lid on him, due to load shedding with generators began to accelerate and others working with at the time. Seven promotion still working at that moment occurs at Hydro-otklûčaûŝejsâ management system. Water wave, hleŝuŝej of turbine well second generating consistently destroyed control system aggregates, confusing oil tanks, which cut lubrication of the bearings are still rotating rotors. Because the hydraulic units were connected with transformers in pairs, each pair of automatics, apparently, still had their emergency brake after disconnecting the transformer due to the destruction of the first of a pair of hydrounit. That is why units with even numbers greater than two received the lowest damage (see fig. 2). The fifth hydroelectric generator in a couple at the time was the sixth loss in the six months prior to that. So that the system of emergency protection of SPC "Rakurs" in the development of the disaster apparently still was helped by the fact that it was still possible to save, but fail-safe action valves on its upstream were closed because there was no management system design

Результаты (английский) 2:

After having been destroyed by the second hydraulic unit, and the first hydropower unit was severely damaged fallen on his cap electric generator due to load shedding generators began to accelerate and others working at the time hydroelectric. Promotion of the seven still working at the time when the hydraulic units occurred disables the control system. Wave of water gushing out of the well of the second hydroelectric turbine, consistently destroying aggregates management system, churning butter capacity, because of what has stopped bearing lubrication of rotating rotors. As the hydraulic units are connected to the transformer in pairs, the automation of every second of the pair, apparently, still have time to slow down after their emergency shutdown of the transformer due to the destruction of the first hydraulic unit of the pair. That is why the units even numbered more than two received the least damage (see. Fig. 2). The fifth hydropower unit in the pair at the time was not included because of the shutdown of the sixth six months earlier. So that the system of emergency protection "SPC" Rakurs Ltd. "in the development of disaster, apparently still saved what was still possible to save, but the safety stops on the upper reach it were not closed because their management was not provided with the system development

Результаты (английский) 3:

after the second гидроагрегат was destroyed, and the first гидроагрегат was severely damaged tree has a electric generator because of the dumping of the load from the power generators are accelerating and others who worked at the time гидроагрегаты. promotion of seven still working at that time гидроагрегатов occurred in отключающейся management system. the wave of water, pour from the well of the second турбинного гидроагрегата, progressively destroying the system management units, churned butter receptacle, which continued to draw lubricant bearings still spinning rotors. as гидроагрегаты were connected with transformers in pairs, each pair at the second, apparently went to their cause to slow down after the transformer due to the destruction of the first of the pair of гидроагрегата. it is therefore even more units and two received the least injury (see para. figure 1. 2). the fifth гидроагрегат pair at that time was not included because of the sixth six months before. so the system of emergency protection llc "npf" ракурс» development catastrophe, apparently still saved what was possible to save, but emergency closures at its upper бьефе closed not because management had not been foreseen in the design of the system