Одновременно с этим с 2010 г. наблюдался процесс восхождения на
российскую политическую сцену нового поколения оппозиционных
политиков. Если в рядах «системной оппозиции» верховные партийные
должности продолжали сохранять старые кадры, то на фланге
«несистемной», в том числе левой оппозиции, появились такие молодые
фигуры как С. Удальцов, А. Навальный, С. Митрохин, В. Милов и другие.
Эти молодые политики стали постепенно превращаться в новых лидеров
общественного мнения политизированной части российского общества.
Используя более радикальную риторику и современные, боле
демократические методы общения, они выгодно отличались как от
бюрократических политиков от власти, так и от приобретших вид
«номенклатуры» представителей «системно оппозиции».
Можно сказать, что если власть столкнулась с вызовом консервации
элит, то новые оппозиционные политики стали преодолевать проблему
лидерского кризиса. Вместе с тем, будет справедливо сказать, что указанные
процессы только начались и пока не приобрели завершенные формы.
Говорить о полном преобладании оппозиции по рассматриваемому
параметру по отношению к власти пока рано.
Идеологические ресурсы
Идеологический спектр оппозиции 1990-х гг., который был достаточно
широк, различные исследователи пытались систематизировать на основе
самых разных классификационных подходов. Одним из наиболее
общепризнанных стал подход В. Прибыловского, который предложил
выделять такие идейные течения оппозиции постсоветского периода как
либерал - демократическое, коммунистическое и национал –
патриотическое.5 В самом общем смысле линия идеологического водораздела
между властью и оппозицией в то время пролегала по отношению к
либерально-рыночным реформам, осуществляемых властью. Наиболее
сильными идеологическими ресурсами стала обладать партия КПРФ, которая
смогла синтезировать классические идеи марскизма-ленинизма с элементами
патриотического национализма и социал-демократии. Этот идеологический
синкретизм КПРФ американский исследователь Р. Саква определил как
«государственно-патриотический коммунизм».6
Идеология КПРФ находила отклик среди тех слоев населения, которые
сохраняли ностальгию по советской системе, а также среди тех, кто оказался
в проигрыше от осуществленных либерально-рыночных реформ. Как
отмечают исследователи, КПРФ стала одной из немногих российских партий,
электоральная база которой во многом основывалась на идеологических
ресурсах, а не на харизматических свойствах партийного лидера.7 Можно
5 Россия: партия, выборы, власть. – М.: Обозреватель, 1996., с. 35 – 58.
6 Sakwa R. Left or Right? The CPRF and the Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia // The Journal of
Communist Studies and Transition Politics. – 1998. - V. 14. - № 1 -2. - Р. 139.
сказать, что идеологический ресурс у доминирующей оппозиционной партии
рассматриваемого этапа был очень ярко выражен, что позволяло ей иметь
стабильную электоральную поддержку в условиях поляризации российского
общества по линии «реформы» - «анти-реформы».
В тоже время, этот идеологический ресурс не был всеобъемлющим,
имел ограничения и его было крайне трудно конвертировать в расширение
поддержки избирателей. Анализ электоральной базы КПРФ привел
исследователей к выводу, что ядро идеологического электората партии не
превышало 15-20%.8 За все время 1990-х гг. доля россиян, разделяющих
антиреформистские установки КПРФ, не составляло большинства и
максимально консолидировалось на президентских выборах 1996, когда
представитель коммунистов Г. Зюганов смог заручиться поддержкой 40%
электората.9
Американские исследователи Р. Роуз, Н. Манро и У. Мишлер на основе
социологических данных пришли к выводу, что, несмотря на низкую
поддержку российскими гражданами власти во главе с президентом Б.
Ельциным, альтернативы действующему режиму рассматривались ими как
еще менее предпочтительные
Результаты (
английский) 1:
[копия]Скопировано!
At the same time with the 2010 г. There has been a process of climbing the Russian political scene of the new generation of opposition politicians. If in the ranks of "systemic opposition" paramount party the post continued to retain the old footage, on the flank "non-system", including the left opposition, there are young figures like udaltsov, a. navalny, s. Mitrokhin, v. Milov and other. These policies became gradually emerge as new leaders public opinion politicized part of Russian society. Using more radical rhetoric and modern, Bole democratic methods of communication, they differed from both profitable bureaucratic politicians from power, and acquired type "nomenclature" representatives "systematic opposition". It can be said that if the Government was faced with a challenge to conservation elite, the new opposition politicians began to overcome the problem a leadership crisis. However, it is fair to say that the only processes started and has not yet acquired the completed form. Talk about a complete predominance of opposition on the issue parameter in relation to authorities yet. Ideological resourcesThe ideological spectrum of the opposition 1990-ies, which was fairly wide variety of researchers have tried to organize on the basis of the most different classification approaches. One of the most the generally accepted approach became Pribylovskogo, which invited allocate such ideological currents of the opposition of the post-Soviet period as the liberal-democratic, Communist and national- patriotic. 5 in the most general sense of the ideological line of the watershed between the Government and the opposition at the time ran towards the liberal market reforms carried out by the authority. Most strong ideological resources have become the party of the COMMUNIST PARTY, which able to synthesize classical ideas marskizma Marxism-Leninism with elements Patriotic nationalism and social democracy. This ideological syncretism CPRF American researcher r. Sakva identified as "State-patriotic 6 communism". KPRF ideology found a response among those segments of the population maintain nostalgia for the Soviet system, as well as among those who have been the loser of the liberal market reforms that have been implemented. As the researchers note, the COMMUNIST PARTY has become one of the few Russian parties, electoral base largely based on ideological resources rather than on the charismatic party leader properties. 7 you can Russia 5: party election authority. -М.: Columnist, 1996, p. 35-58. 6 R Sakwa. Left or Right? The CPRF and the Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia//The Journal of He Studies and Transition Politics. -1998. -V. 14. # 1 -2. -P. 139. say that the ideological resource from the dominant opposition party the reporting phase was very pronounced, which allowed her to have a stable electoral support in the face of Russian polarization society through "reforms"-"anti-reform". At the same time, this ideological resource was not comprehensive, had limitations and it was extremely difficult to convert into an extension of the voters ' support. Analysis of the electoral base of the CPRF led researchers concluded that the core ideology of the electorate of the party is not exceed 15-20%. 8 for all time 1990-ies. the proportion of Russians, who share antireformistskie installation of the COMMUNIST PARTY, was not the majority and the maximum consolidated 1996 presidential election, when the representative of the Communists g. Zyuganov was able to enlist the support of 40% 9. American researchers r. Rose, n. Munro and w. Mišler based on sociological data have concluded that, despite the low support for Russian citizens, the authorities, led by President b. Yeltsin, an alternative to the current regime considered them as even less preferred
переводится, пожалуйста, подождите..

Результаты (
английский) 2:
[копия]Скопировано!
At the same time since 2010 there was a process of climbing on the Russian political scene a new generation of opposition politicians. If the ranks of "systemic opposition" supreme party positions continued to keep the old footage, it is on the flank of "non-system", including left-wing opposition, there were so young figures as S. Udaltsov, A. Navalny, Sergei Mitrokhin, Milov and other . These young politicians gradually began to turn into the new leaders of the public opinion politicized part of Russian society. Using a more radical rhetoric and modern Bole democratic methods of communication, they are advantageously differed from both the bureaucratic politics of the government and of the acquired form of "nomenklatura" representatives "systemically opposition. "We can say that if the government was faced with the challenge of conservation elites, the new opposition politicians began to overcome the problem of leadership crisis. However, it is fair to say that these processes have just started and has not yet acquired the finished form. Talking about the complete dominance of the opposition on the considered parameter in relation to the government until early. Ideological Resources of the ideological spectrum of the opposition of the 1990s., Which was quite wide various researchers have tried to organize on the basis of a variety of classification approaches. One of the most universally accepted approach became V. Pribylovsky, who proposed to allocate such ideological currents of the opposition post-Soviet period as a liberal - democratic, communist and nationalist - patrioticheskoe.5 In the most general sense, the ideological line of the watershed between the government and the opposition at the time ran towards the liberal -rynochnym reforms undertaken by the government. The most powerful ideological resources have become the party of the Communist Party, which was able to synthesize the ideas of classical marskizma-Leninism with the elements of patriotic nationalism and social democracy. This ideological syncretism of the Communist Party American researcher R. Sakwa identified as "state-patriotic communism" .6 The ideology of the Communist Party finds a response among those segments of the population that remained nostalgic for the Soviet system, as well as among those who turned out to be a loser from implementing liberal market reforms . As the researchers note, the Communist Party was one of the few Russian parties, the electoral base is largely based on ideological resources, and not on the properties of the charismatic party can lidera.7 5 Russia: party, elections, authorities. - M .: Observer, 1996, p. 35 - 58. 6 Sakwa R. Left or Right? The CPRF and The Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia // The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. - 1998. - V. 14. - № 1 -2. - P. 139. say that the ideological life of the opposition party from dominating the stage in question has been very pronounced, which allowed her to have a stable electoral support in a polarization of Russian society through the "reform" - "anti-reform". At the same time, the ideological resource was not comprehensive, had limitations and it was extremely difficult to convert to an extension of voter support. Analysis of the electoral base of the Communist Party led the researchers to conclude that the core ideological constituency parties did not exceed 15-20% .8 Total 1990s. The share of Russians who share antireformist installation of the Communist Party, not the majority and the most consolidated on the 1996 presidential election, when the representative of the Communist Gennady Zyuganov was able to enlist the support of 40% elektorata.9 American researchers R. Rose, N. Munro and William Mishler, based on sociological data We came to the conclusion that, despite the low support for Russian citizens government headed by President Boris Yeltsin, an alternative to the current regime is seen as even less preferable
переводится, пожалуйста, подождите..

Результаты (
английский) 3:
[копия]Скопировано!
at the same time, since 2010. there has been a process of russian political scene
the new generation of opposition politicians. if the "systemic opposition" the party
positions continued to maintain the old pictures, flank
"несистемной», including the left opposition, the appearance of such figures as young
. удальцов, as well. навальный,. митрохин,. milow, germany and others.
these new policies have gradually become the new leaders
public opinion political part of russian society.
using the more radical rhetoric and modern, more
democratic methods of communication, it is different from
the bureaucratic politicians from power, and obtain a kind of "
" номенклатуры» systemically opposition ".
you can sayif the power is faced with the challenge of conservation
elite, new opposition politicians have overcome the problem
the leadership crisis. however, it is fair to say that the
process has just begun and have not yet been completed form.
to complete dominance of the opposition on the
parameter relative to power until the early.
the ideological resourcesideological opposition of the 1990s, which was pretty
is wide, different researchers have tried to organize on the basis of
different classification approaches. one of the most
a generally accepted approach. прибыловского, which suggested that
to allocate such intentional the opposition post soviet period as
the liberal democratic, communist and nationalist, patriotic
.5 in the general sense, the ideological divide
between the authority and the opposition at the time, goes to the
the liberal market reforms implemented by power. most
strong ideological resources of the party began to be кпрф that
could synthesize the ideas марскизма leninism with elements of
patriotic nationalism and social democracy.this ideological
syncretism кпрф american explorer r. саква identified as
"public patriotic коммунизм».6
ideology кпрф found adherents among segments of the population that
retain the nostalgia for the soviet system, as well as among those who had been
lose implemented liberal reforms. as
the researchers кпрф became one of the few russian parties
electoral base which is largely based on ideological
resources rather than on харизматических properties of party лидера.7 can
5 russia: the party, the election authority. - m., editor, 1996.,. 35 - 58.
6 Sakwa r.left or right? the CPRF and the problem of democratic consolidation in russia / / the journal of communist studies and transition politics
. - 1998. - v 14. - no. 1 - 2. - r. 139.
, ideological resource are the dominant opposition party
the stage was very clearly expressed that allowed her to have
stable electoral support in the context of polarization of the
society under the "reform", "anti reform".
at the same time.this ideological resource was not comprehensive,
have restrictions and it was extremely difficult to convert in the
voters' support. analysis of the electoral base кпрф
led researchers to the conclusionthe party's ideological electorate
exceeded 15% - 20% of.8 during the 1990s. the percentage of russians want
антиреформистские installation кпрф, was most and
the maximum консолидировалось in the presidential election of 1996, when the communists,
. zyuganov was able to enlist the support of 40% электората.9
american researchers r. rose, n. munroe and. мишлер based on
sociological data concluded that, despite the low
for russian citizens, government, led by president b.
yeltsin, alternative to the current regime considered them as
a less preferred
переводится, пожалуйста, подождите..
